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Let’s Shake on it: Perceived Pre-contractual 
Risk in Cross-border Investment 
Kevin J. Fandl, J.D., Ph.D.* 
This article asks whether a legal system that provides protection 
for commitments made prior to contract formation is more or less 
conducive to risk-taking by foreign investors than a legal system 
that does not. I surmise that increased levels of protection for pre-
contractual commitments establish an environment more 
hospitable to new business development, giving potential 
entrepreneurs added security in their ventures. And I further 
surmise that different legal traditions provide different levels of 
protection for these pre-contractual commitments. 
To better understand the risks faced by cross-border business 
investors, this article describes the key distinctions between legal 
systems that create potential liability for an unwitting investor and 
how they affect pre-contractual liability. It then links these risks 
with levels of investment by performing a quantitative assessment 
of the relationship between legal tradition and entrepreneurial 
activity, followed by a contextual analysis of conversations with 
cross-jurisdictional legal practitioners. It concludes by showing 
the distinctions in pre-contractual liability rules between civil and 
common law legal systems have a significant impact on potential 
investment. 
 
                                                                                                             
 *  Kevin J. Fandl, Ph.D. (George Mason University), J.D./ M.A. (American University), 
B.A. (Lock Haven University), is an Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Strategic 
Global Management and the Academic Director for Global Immersion Programs at the Fox 
School of Business, Temple University. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This article addresses whether perceived risks from the attachment of 
liability during pre-contractual negotiations affects cross-border 
investment. It addresses risks that result from differences in legal traditions 
between common and civil law countries. These risks can be mitigated to 
some extent by effective legal counsel; however, they may also serve as a 
deterrent to potential entrepreneurs looking to business abroad. 
Nobel laureate Douglass North identified the institutional 
environment of a country as a significant factor in determining that 
country’s economic growth trajectory. To North, institutions set forth the 
“rules of the game,” which provided economic actors with predictable 
legal and policy environments within which to operate. The more effective 
the institutions, the more likely the economic growth. 
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North identified contract enforcement as one of key aspects of 
effective institutions.1 In the absence of state enforcement of contracts, 
religious or moral concepts provide the only means of enforcement.2 The 
rise of institutions such as courts and effective laws, along with improved 
respect for the law—often termed “rule of law” 3—allowed for the 
establishment of more complex and long-term contracts. The 
predictability of contract enforcement became an incentive to trust beyond 
a small circle of known associates.4 
A key indicator of the strength of a society’s rule of law is the 
effectiveness of contract enforcement in that society, a function of the 
courts in most instances. A party’s trust in its legal institutions often 
depends on whether those institutions will protect parties against unfair 
dealing and contract breach.5 A positive societal perception of their 
institutional strength and willingness to enforce contract law affects that 
society’s economic performance by providing the guarantees necessary to 
facilitate effective business development.6 Inefficient institutions, 
therefore, fail to provide the environment necessary to sustain effective 
business growth and economic development. 
The idea that legal institutions play a role in facilitating an effective 
commercial environment is not new.7 Political economist, Douglass North, 
described institutions as the “humanly devised constraints that structure 
political economic and social interaction” in 1991.8 In that article, North 
used a number of commercial examples to explain the importance of 
having effective legal institutions in place to protect transactions beyond 
the small circle of family and known associates, allowing for long-distance 
                                                                                                             
1 Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 97, 102 (1991) 
(explaining that effective enforcement of contracts will permit more complex forms of 
economic exchange). 
2 Id. at 99 (describing religious precepts as establishing the “standards of conduct” 
among parties in the absence of a state). 
3 See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, The History and Elements of the Rule of Law, 2012 
SING. J. OF LEGAL STUD. 232, 233. 
4 See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, Promises, Trust, and Contract Law, 47 AM. J. OF JURIS. 
25, 29 (2002) (discussing the role of trust in facilitating contracts outside close networks). 
5 See, e.g., Enforcing Contracts, WORLD BANK, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/enforcing-contracts/good-practices (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2019) (footnote omitted). 
6 See Rafael La Porta, et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1140 (1998) 
[hereinafter LLSV]; see also Carmine Guerriero, Legal Traditions and Economic 
Performances: Theory and Evidence (Nov. 14, 2010), ENCYC. OF LAW AND ECON., 
Francesco Parisi and Richard Posner, eds., (Forthcoming; Amsterdam Ctr. for Law & Econ. 
Working Paper No. 2010-12). 
7 See generally, Douglass C. North, Institutions and Economic Theory, 36 THE AM. 
ECON. 3 (1992). 
8 North, supra note 1, at 97. 
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trade.9 His theory built on previous work of Ronald Coase, who 
highlighted the relationship between effective contract enforcement and 
institutional quality.10 
Later scholars built upon the work of Coase and North and began 
connecting a state’s economic performance with not only the quality of its 
institutions but to the legal system that those institutions enforce. A 
controversial article written by a group of Harvard and University of 
Chicago scholars in 1998, linked legal tradition with economic 
performance and, more precisely, suggested that civil law traditions yield 
less effective institutions than common law traditions.11 They expound 
upon their “Legal Origins” theory in a more recent paper in which they 
argue that civil law embraces “socially-conditioned private contracting” 
whereas common law supports “unconditioned private contracting.”12 
The resulting analysis from these scholars was integrated into the 
World Bank’s Doing Business series, which advises about the investment 
climate on the basis of a number of factors, including institutional 
effectiveness.13 Institutional effectiveness, a measure of quality 
governance, was measured in part by the effectiveness of contract 
enforcement.14 
Numerous excellent research papers and case studies explore the 
relationship between legal tradition and business environment.15 They 
assess elements such as institutional capacity, enforcement of contracts 
and legal obligations, and transparency. Yet one element not sufficiently 
addressed is the effect of distinct legal traditions on the pre-contractual 
environment for doing business. In other words, does legal tradition 
impact the willingness of a party to take the risk of engaging in potentially 
                                                                                                             
9 Id. at 100 (“Such societies need effective, impersonal contract enforcement, because 
personal ties, voluntaristic constraints, and ostracism are no longer effective as more 
complex and impersonal forms of exchange emerge.”). 
10 See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
11 Rafael La Porta, et al., The Quality of Government 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 6727, 1998) (finding that more government intervention, which is 
associated with civil law governments, yields lower efficiency). 
12 Rafael La Porta, et. al, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. OF ECON. 
LIT. 285, 288 (2008); see also Katharina Pistor, Legal Ground Rules in Coordinated and 
Liberal Market Economies, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT: CORPORATIONS, 
STATES, AND MARKETS IN EUROPE, JAPAN, AND THE US (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 2006). 
13 See Doing Business, WORLD BANK, www.doingbusiness.org (last visited Jan. 29, 
2019). 
14 See DOING BUSINESS, WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2018: REFORMING TO CREATE 
JOBS 12 (2017) (identifying “Enforcing Contracts,” measured by the time and cost to 
resolve disputes, as one of 11 areas of business regulation). 
15 Ralf Michaels, Symposium on Legal Origins: Comparative Law By Numbers? Legal 
Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and The Silence of Traditional Comparative Law, 
57 AM. J. COMP. L. 765 (2009). 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 219 
risky business negotiations that may not result in a contract and that may, 
ultimately, cause a party to change position in a way that causes them 
harm? 
A contract is not simply a set of formal promises made between 
parties; it is a series of acts that bring parties together into a commercial 
relationship. These acts may include letters of intent, oral negotiations, 
non-disclosure agreements, draft versions of a final contract, and 
ultimately the establishment of formal contract terms. All of these actions 
require some risk and commitment of resources by the intending parties, 
which would likely not happen in the absence of the security provided by 
contract law. Courts in most developed countries provide protection for 
finalized contracts; however, different legal systems provide varying 
protections for parties in earlier stages of contract formation, thereby 
creating distinct legal environments for the promotion of business 
development. 
The best way to avoid liability and uncertainty in conducting cross-
jurisdictional commercial transactions is to have experienced legal counsel 
guiding the process. However, high costs and a belief that lawyers may 
hinder the entrepreneurial drive of a newer firm has led some firms to 
engage in some of their cross-border work sans legal counsel,16 despite the 
array of business advice against that approach.17 Even with the assistance 
of counsel, working across legal jurisdictions often requires consultation 
with foreign experts who understand the unique elements of their own 
legal system.18 This places foreign investors without appropriate counsel 
in a precarious position. 
In this paper, I will examine pre-contractual liability in common law 
and civil law systems as a marker of institutional efficiency and business 
opportunity. I will build upon North’s institutional analysis theory by 
showing how transaction costs are higher in civil law systems that impose 
                                                                                                             
16 Cliff Ennico, How to Hire an Attorney, ENTREPRENEUR, 2015 (“Most small businesses 
put off hiring a lawyer until the sheriff is standing at the door serving them with a 
summons.”). 
17 See, e.g., Michael Acosta, Why Your New Business Needs a Lawyer Yesterday, 
ENTREPRENEUR, May 23, 2014; see also Padraig Walsh, How to Know if Your Startup 
Needs a Lawyer, FORBES (Oct. 21, 2016, 2:20 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/walshpadraig/2016/10/21/when-do-startups-need-
lawyers/#7e805bad447b; Daniel Doktori and Sarah Reed, Why Lawyers Make Good Early-
Stage Startup Hires, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/05/why-
lawyers-make-good-early-stage-startup-hires. 
18 See, e.g., Ettore A. Santucci, How Can U.S. and Non-U.S. Lawyers Work Together to 
Improve Opinion Practice in Cross-Border Transactions?, BUS. L. TODAY (Jan. 19, 2017), 
https://businesslawtoday.org/2017/01/how-can-u-s-and-non-u-s-lawyers-work-together-
to-improve-opinion-practice-in-cross-border-transactions/ (explaining the difficulties 
faced by businesspeople that rely on their local counsel while attempting to work in foreign 
jurisdictions). 
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liability prior to the conclusion of a contract than in common law systems 
that do not. I will also build upon La Porta’s theory by showing how parties 
can avoid the trap of inefficient contract institutions through effective legal 
counsel,19 to understand how firms change their behavior on the basis of 
the presence or absence of effective institutions, and how this promotes 
the environment necessary for effective business development.20 
This article begins by explaining the importance of understanding the 
risks of pre-contractual liability in cross-jurisdictional investments, 
highlighting the gap between a potential investor’s “gentlemen’s 
agreement” and a valid legal commitment. It moves on to compare legal 
traditions with respect to their treatment of pre-contractual acts with a 
short history of the development of contract rules in each tradition. It then 
identifies four perceived risks of pre-contractual liability that differ 
between these legal traditions. Finally, I attempt to show a quantifiable 
link between legal tradition and investment climate through a quantitative 
and qualitative analysis. 
DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
A.  Nature of the Problem 
The central question in this analysis is whether a country’s legal 
tradition—that is, common or civil law—affects entrepreneurial activity 
in that country. Liability for assertions made during the contract 
negotiation process differ amongst common and civil law jurisdictions, 
affecting levels of risk for negotiating parties. For purposes of this 
analysis, I define negotiation risk as entering into negotiations for a 
potential contract at arms-length with one or more parties without any 
certainty about the outcome of those negotiations. 
It is commonly understood that once two parties have formalized a 
contract, either through signatures or some related closing process (e.g., 
notarization), the parties take on a duty to perform, which in layman’s 
terms refers to an obligation to abide by the commitments made in the 
agreement. Failure to comply with the terms of the agreement may lead to 
liability by the non-compliant or breaching party, which in turn may mean 
                                                                                                             
19 La Porta, et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J. OF L, ECON., AND ORG. 222, 251–52 
(1999) (explaining that French civil law countries have less efficient and more 
interventionist policies toward contracts than German or common law systems); Daron 
Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. OF POL ECON. 949, 954 
(2005) (arguing that contracting institutions affect investors but not necessarily the overall 
investment climate since investors have alternatives available). 
20 See generally Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Social Structure and Organizations, in 
HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONS 142 (James G. March ed., 1965). 
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litigation or arbitration to resolve the dispute. The duty is what establishes 
legal liability for a party to a contract.21 
Before that duty arises, however, there is a period in which the parties 
go through negotiation—sometimes simple, sometimes quite extensive 
and extending over many years.22 Agreements reached during this 
preliminary phase—often known as “gentleman’s agreements”23—may 
give confidence to the parties that a legally binding commitment has been 
made. Indeed, in many cases, these early agreements result in the 
establishment of a formal contract that binds the parties. In many other 
cases, however, one or both of the parties will decide that a contract is not 
appropriate and will terminate negotiations. From the perspective of the 
common law, the outcome of the negotiations is immaterial—liability will 
only attach under contract law if a contract is in fact concluded.24 This may 
not be the case under civil law rules. 
It is important to note that during this pre-contractual period, parties 
may enter into other preliminary agreements. These can include non-
disclosure agreements (NDA),25 confidentiality agreements,26 and letters 
of intent, for instance. The NDA and confidentiality agreements are meant 
to create an independent contract giving rise to a cause of action for 
activities external to the contract itself. The letter of intent,27 however, 
speaks to the good faith negotiation of the contract. The latter is treated by 
courts almost without exception as a non-binding agreement to agree and 
                                                                                                             
21 See Lamoureux v. Burrillville Racing Ass’n, 161 A.2d 213 (1960). 
22 See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Pre-contractual Liability and Preliminary 
Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 221–23 
(1987) (explaining the freedom of negotiation approach taken in U.S. contract negotiation 
processes). 
23 F. Willem Grosheide, The Gentleman’s Agreement in Legal Theory and Modern 
Practice 109, 113 (unpublished manuscript) (explaining that these agreements are made in 
the “shadow of the law” and that, though not often binding, may be used for interpretation 
of other commitments made between the parties), https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream
/handle/1874/42822/b6.pdf. 
24 Farnsworth, supra note 22, at 242–43 (discussing the approach of U.S. courts as 
aleatory and disinterested in the negotiation itself). 
25 See, e.g., Neva B. Jeffries, Preliminary Negotiations or Binding Obligations? A 
Framework for Determining the Intent of the Parties, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 8 (2012) 
(explaining that an NDA is a binding agreement that is often utilized during contract 
negotiations in which disclosure of information about the negotiation itself could hinder 
the successful conclusion of a contract). 
26 See, e.g., Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement Dealmaking in 
Complex Mergers and Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1410–11 (2016) (discussing 
the common use of confidentiality agreements in corporate takeover bids to prevent 
discussion of the existence of a negotiation or offer). 
27 Also known as a “commitment letter,” “memorandum of understanding,” or “term 
sheet.” 
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carries with it no legal remedy in the absence of bad faith.28 The former 
agreements carry with them remedies but not for breach of the principal 
contract. For the purpose of this discussion, I limit my analysis to liability 
for the underlying contract only. 
During this negotiation period, a party may take certain steps in 
anticipation of the conclusion of a contract with their counterparty. For 
instance, a party may secure financing from a lending institution, hire 
additional labor, or terminate negotiations with other potential partners. 
While none of these actions are mandated by the other party, they are a 
natural outgrowth of the negotiation. Each of these actions require a 
commitment of resources that would not have been expended but for the 
expectation of a contract at the end of the negotiation period. If the contract 
does not materialize, who should bear responsibility for covering the 
losses associated with the expenditure of these resources? To a common 
law lawyer, the answer may seem obvious—these are sunk costs that are 
not reimbursable. But to a civil law lawyer, the answer may be quite 
different. 
PRE-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY DEFINED 
It is important at the outset of this discussion to define precisely what 
pre-contractual liability means.29 For purposes of our discussion, pre-
contractual liability refers to legal consequences and economic damages 
resulting from commitments made by one party during contract 
negotiations but before any contract is concluded.30 Cases for pre-
contractual liability can be based upon evidence gathered from documents 
exchanged during the negotiations, which may demonstrate party’s intent 
toward a particular transaction.31 They express many of the likely 
covenants and conditions of the forthcoming contract without actually 
agreeing to any of those clauses or conditions. In the eyes of business 
professionals, these are binding commitments to negotiate a binding 
                                                                                                             
28 See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 22, at 252 (explaining that “[p]reliminary 
agreements, whatever their type, rarely raise questions under the classic rules of offer and 
acceptance.”). 
29 See id. at 223 (“The law of pre-contractual liability is relatively undeveloped, even on 
the grounds that are already recognized. This may be due in part to the considerable 
uncertainty that surrounds the measure of recovery under any of these grounds.”). 
30 See Grosheide, supra note 23, at 104 (defining pre-contractual agreements as any 
agreements “that tend to pave the way to an actual contract”). 
31 See generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Pre-Contractual Liability and 
Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 662 (2007). 
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contract. In the eyes of legal professionals, they are dangerously 
ambiguous commitments that may or may not be enforceable in court.32 
Pre-contractual liability in common law systems is a curious thing. A 
contract by common law definition is a promise or set of promises that, 
when breached, is remediable in a court of law.33 In a few cases, a court 
may decide that the parties had agreed to the majority of terms and 
intended to be bound by those terms even though a formal contract was 
not concluded.34 In many others, only an agreement to agree was created, 
resulting in no liability for failure to go forward with a contract. Yet the 
line between the two is highly uncertain and perhaps nonexistent. In 
referring to letters of intent, the key pre-contractual document, the great E. 
Allan Farnsworth once quipped that “[i]t would be difficult to find a less 
predictable area of contract law.” 35 
As a general matter, common law offers no recovery of resources 
spent on a failed contract negotiation. But if the loss results from a 
completed contract negotiation, that party will be able to pursue the 
standard contract breach remedy—expectation damages. The area in 
between a failed negotiation and a completed contract is a minefield for 
contract lawyers in common law courts. In an excellent article outlining 
the range of options for remedies in this gray area, Professors Alan 
Schwartz and Robert E. Scott explain that there are three potential 
outcomes of an incomplete negotiation: 1) if the negotiation never led to 
an agreement on material terms, no remedy is available; 2) if the 
negotiation led to agreement on all material terms and the parties intended 
to memorialize the agreement in the near future, a court will treat that as a 
contract and award expectation damages in the event of breach; or, 3) if 
the negotiation led to most terms being agreed upon but some left open for 
negotiation, the parties are required to negotiate in good faith but are not 
eligible for expectation damages yet; however, if a party negotiated in bad 
faith, they may be liable for reliance damages.36 
In contrast, civil law jurisdictions provide much more clarity and 
protection for victims of pre-contractual negotiation “breaches” by 
                                                                                                             
32 J. Andrew Holten, Letters of Intent in Corporate Negotiations: Using Hostage 
Exchanges and Legal Uncertainty to Promote Compliance, 162 U. PENN L. REV. 1237, 
1247 (2014). 
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
34 See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 788–89 (Tex. App. 1st 1987) 
(concluding that even an informal agreement can become binding if intent is shown, and 
explaining that whether the parties have agreed upon all “essential terms of [an] alleged 
contract” is one of the factors used to “determine whether the parties intended to be bound 
only by a formal, signed writing”). 
35 Farnsworth, supra note 22, at 259–60. 
36 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary 
Agreements, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 661, 664–65 (2007). 
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establishing predictable, statutory remedies. The French civil code defines 
a contract as “an agreement by which one or several persons bind 
themselves, towards one or several others, to transfer, to do or not to do 
something.”37 Note the lack of reference to agreements remediable in court 
only. In addition to the basic duty of negotiating in good faith, which is 
applied in both common law and civil law jurisdictions, several doctrines 
in civil law provide explicit remedies for parties aggrieved by negotiations 
that did not result in reasonable outcomes. These remedies are built into 
the body of civil law that I will explain below. 
The question this article explores is whether foreign investors face 
increased legal risk in cross-border transactions in either civil or common 
law systems, and whether this may deter investment. This requires asking 
whether there are any significant distinctions between common and civil 
law contract laws that would generate additional risk for potential 
investors; if so, whether those risks affect the overall investment climate; 
and how those risks can be mitigated. The next section explains the 
methodology used to conduct this mixed methods analysis. 
PRE-CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM 
According to the fictionalized version of the story, in 1961, 
entrepreneur Ray Kroc famously shook the hand of Dick McDonald after 
agreeing to pay McDonald and his brother $2.7 million as an ownership 
buyout and agreeing to give a percentage of future profits in the 
McDonald’s franchise. The lump sum was paid, but the recurring profit 
checks were never provided despite the enormous success of the 
enterprise. Essentially, the original founders of the McDonald’s restaurant 
were written out of history with a single payment by Ray Kroc and a 
handshake.38 McDonald’s revenues were near $6 billion in 2017.39 
Handshakes and similar gestures are commonplace in the business 
community. Deals are often made away from the comforts of an attorney’s 
office, where a proper contract might be drawn-up. And in many cases, the 
handshake is followed-up with a formal contract or the performance of the 
agreement, both of which provide the legal authority to enforce the terms 
of the contract in court or arbitration. However, as any lawyer will tell his 
or her client, the gesture alone is not enough to create an actionable 
agreement. 
                                                                                                             
37 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1101 (Fr.). 
38 See David Brancaccio, The True Origin Story Behind McDonald’s, MARKETPLACE 
(Feb. 9, 2017, 6:07 AM), https://www.marketplace.org/2017/02/09/business/ray-kroc-
mcdonalds-fast-food. 
39 See, e.g., McDonald’s Serves Up Surging Sales and Profits, BBC NEWS (Oct. 24, 
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-41728541. 
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[O]ne has to bear in mind that commercial men do not 
look at these things quite from the lawyer’s point of 
view . . . .[Although a lawyer would consider an 
instrument to be worthless] a commercial man would 
regard the guarantee, perhaps furnished in the form of [a] 
letter, as having some value as underlining, as it were, the 
promise that had been undertaken.40 
In a famous English common law case, a U.S. distributor of carbon 
paper products, which were manufactured by an English firm, signed a 
document stating the following:41 
This arrangement is not entered into, nor is this 
memorandum written, as a formal or legal agreement and 
shall not be subject to legal jurisdiction in the Law 
Courts . . . but it is only a definite expression and record 
of the purpose and intention of the three parties 
concerned, to which they each honourably pledge 
themselves with the fullest confidence—based upon past 
business with each other—that it will be carried through 
by each of the three parties with mutual loyalty and 
friendly co-operation.42 
The English company (Crompton) terminated the agreement without 
notice and refused to execute orders placed prior to termination. The 
American plaintiffs brought suit for breach of contract and non-delivery 
of goods. The English court found no binding contract on the basis of the 
language above. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Atkin provided useful 
language as to why such language would not be binding: 
To create a contract there must be a common intention of 
the parties to enter into legal obligations, mutually 
communicated expressly or impliedly. Such an intention 
ordinarily will be inferred when parties enter into an 
agreement which in other respects conforms to the rules 
of law as to the formation of contracts.43 
                                                                                                             
40 Larry A. DiMatteo, The CISG and the Presumption of Enforceability: Unintended 
Contractual Liability in International Business Dealings, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 111, 116 
(1997). 
41 Rose and Frank Co. v. J.R. Crompton & Bros. Ltd. [1924] UKLH 2, [1925] AC 445 
(HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
42 Id. 
43 Rose and Frank Co. v. J.R. Crompton & Bros. Ltd. [1923] 2 L. Rep. Incorporated 
Council L. Rep., KBD 261, [293] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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The judge went on to explain that language suggesting the desire to 
formalize in the future the terms agreed to preliminarily also would negate 
the enforceability of those preliminary terms: 
I might add that a common instance of effect being given 
in law to the express intention of the parties not to be 
bound in law is to be found in cases where parties agree 
to all the necessary terms of an agreement for purchase 
and sale, but subject to a contract being drawn up. The 
words of the preliminary agreement in other respects may 
be apt and sufficient to constitute an open contract, but if 
the parties in so agreeing make it plain that they do not 
intend to be bound except by some subsequent document, 
they remain unbound though no further negotiation be 
contemplated. Either side is free to abandon the 
agreement and to refuse to assent to any legal obligation; 
when the parties are bound they are bound by virtue only 
of the subsequent document.44 
Other cases have similarly held that language of non-enforceability 
generally negates even formally-drafted language in an agreement.45 The 
value of any preliminary promise or assurance is based largely upon its 
degree of detail: The detail and strength of the language is positively 
correlated with reliance from the other party. 
One form of assurance commonly used in business practice is the 
comfort letter. “An estimated ninety-five percent of all comfort letters are 
issued by a parent company to obtain financing for a subsidiary.” Consider 
the case of Chemco Leasing S.p.A. v. Rediffusion Pic., in which Justice 
Staughton described comfort letters as a “gentlemen’s agreement” 
whereby the business parties are interested in concluding the agreement 
even though certain particularities have not yet been ironed out.46 That 
manifest intent was sufficient to prove the existence of a binding contract. 
In that case, Chemco financed a lease for an electronics manufacturer 
partly on the basis of a comfort letter issued by a company (CMC) that 
owned 99.1% of that manufacturer’s shares and stating that those shares 
would not be sold without prior notice to Chemco. Those shares were 
ultimately sold and Chemco later objected to the new shareholders. In 
finding that the comfort letter was actionable, Judge Stanghton stated: 
                                                                                                             
44 Id. at 293–94. 
45 See Stanich v. Hissong Grp., Inc., No. 2:09-cv-0143, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98709 
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2010) (holding an arbitration agreement, which did not require the 
employer to provide advance notice of modification was unenforceable, because it 
constituted an illusory promise and lacked mutuality of obligation). 
46 DiMatteo, supra note 40, at 115. 
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When two businessmen wish to conclude a bargain but 
find that on some particular aspect of it they cannot 
agree, . . . it is not uncommon for them to adopt language 
of deliberate equivocation, so that the contract may be 
signed and their main objective achieved. No doubt they 
console themselves with the thought that all will go well, 
and that the terms in question will never come into 
operation or encounter scrutiny; but if all does not go well, 
it will be for the courts or arbitrators to decide what those 
terms mean. In such a case it is more than somewhat 
artificial for a judge to go through the process, prescribed 
by law, of ascertaining the common intention of the 
parties from the terms of the document and the 
surrounding circumstances; the common intention was in 
reality that the terms should mean what a judge or 
arbitrator should decide that they mean, subject always to 
the views of any higher tribunal.47 
As a general matter, comfort letters and similar preliminary statements 
made by a party during a contract negotiation are not enforceable in 
common law jurisdictions.48 However, as the Chemco case above 
demonstrates, there are exceptions to this rule, such as in the case where a 
promise is made and relied upon by the other party to their detriment. This 
is similar to the doctrine of contra proferentum, in which any ambiguity 
in a document is interpreted against the draftsman.49 In this case, the 
promises are interpreted against the party that made them. 
While the common law system requires commercial agreements to 
meet certain standards in order to constitute enforceable promises, some 
civil law systems apply a default rule: a commercial agreement is binding 
if it contains language that an objective person would consider to be a 
promise.50 A French scholar describes comfort letters as obligations de 
faire, meaning a commitment to perform.51 In common law, much more 
importance is placed upon the precise words used than on the objective 
interpretation of the language. 
                                                                                                             
47 Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Malaysia Mining Corp. Berhad [1988] 1 Lloyd’s L. Rep. 
556 (QB) [560-61] (Eng.). 
48 See DiMatteo, supra note 40, at 117 (explaining that the Queen’s Bench in England 
has previously held that an unsigned comfort letter does not satisfy the statute of frauds, 
and thus, is unenforceable). 
49 See SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 1161 (1st ed. 1920). 
50 See Léon Proscour, France, 6 INT’L BUS. LAW. 302 (1978) (explaining under French 
law letters of responsibility are considered binding “because in the commercial world the 
creation of a meaningless instrument or document is unthinkable”). 
51 Id. 
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The difference between “we agree” and “we pledge” can 
mean the difference between a binding and a non-binding 
promise in common law. U.S. courts have tended to place 
great weight upon the use or nonuse of contractual 
nomenclature. If a comfort letter issuer avoids the 
operative words of contract or guaranty, then she will 
probably avoid contractual liability. However, the use of 
operative phrases such as ‘we agree,’ ‘we undertake,’ or 
‘we promise’ generally will lead U.S. courts to find 
contractual intent.52 
Take for instance the case of Mutual Export Corp. v. Westpac Banking 
Corp., in which a bank that was unable to finalize its letter of credit in time 
for the closing of a deal issued a letter, which stated as follows: 
The Bank has approved at the request of Refrigerated 
Express Lines (A/Asia) Pty Ltd, the establishment of an 
Irrevocable Credit for USD $500,000 in favour of Mutual 
Export Corporation. 
The Bank hereby undertakes to issue the credit in 
the draft form provided by your company, or as mutually 
agreed upon between your company and the Bank.53 
Following the demise of the agreement two years later, the plaintiff 
attempted to draw down on the letter of credit and found that it was unable 
to do so due to an incorrectly notated date in that letter.54 They brought 
suit and the defendant bank argued that the language above made the letter 
unenforceable. 
Applying Australian contract law, the New York court emphasized 
that the language used in the letter stipulating that the bank undertakes its 
obligation to issue the letter of credit, “while not thus mystically 
transforming it into a contract, nevertheless reinforces our concluding that 
a contract was intended.”55 They dismissed the bank’s argument that the 
letter was not a formal document; however, the court emphasized that the 
parties all agreed “that the letter of credit was in place right up until [the] 
plaintiff attempted to draw on it.”56 The words used documents indicating 
intent significantly impact the ultimate interpretation by the court. 
                                                                                                             
52 DiMatteo, supra note 40, at 118 (footnote omitted). 
53 Mut. Exp. Corp. v. Westpac Banking Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1279, 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992). 
54 Id. at 1284. 
55 Id. at 1286. 
56 Id. at 1288. 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 229 
REFRESHER ON CIVIL AND COMMON LAW CONTRACT RULES 
First and foremost, as this is a comparative legal analysis article, it is 
important to distinguish between contractual liability in general across 
common and civil law jurisdictions. As a reminder, common law 
jurisdictions include those countries that, usually due to past colonization, 
follow the principles of British common law. This legal tradition 
emphasizes judicial interpretation of individual cases above legislative 
directives. Civil law jurisdictions constitute most of the remaining 
systems.57 These countries follow some form of code-based law (usually 
French or German) and derive judicial decisions through application of a 
broad array of legislative directives. 
In another publication, I explained civil and common law contracts 
share many common elements.58 In both systems, an effective contract 
requires a valid offer, acceptance, and mutual agreement on the nature of 
the contract. However, there are important differences between contracts 
in these systems as well, such as the requirement for consideration in 
common law contracts and the formalities required for many contracts 
within civil law jurisdictions.59 60 These differences can result in disputes 
for cross-border transactions as parties may be unaware of the distinct 
requirements for contract formation and thus unprepared for resulting 
litigation over the effect of their terms.61 
For the purposes of this article, my examination will focus on 
differences in interpretation and effect across civil and common law 
traditions related to a court’s willingness to impose liability for party 
actions taken prior to closing a deal. More precisely, whether legal 
traditions treat the negotiation process differently with respect to attaching 
liability to a party’s statements and, if so, what impact does this have on 
the entrepreneurial environment in that jurisdiction. The analysis begins 
with clarifying the nature and importance of the problem. 
B.  Distinctions between Legal Traditions 
Common and civil law are two branches of the same tree. However, 
their differences with respect to commercial law are significant.62 Civil 
law emerged in continental Europe out of the precepts of Roman Law and, 
in particular, the Justinian Code. Civil law itself, which was established as 
                                                                                                             
57 Note that there are a number of theocratic countries throughout the Middle East and 
Africa, as well as mixed systems of law in countries such as South Africa. 
58 See Kevin J. Fandl, Cross-border Commercial Contracts and the Ongoing Need for 
Consideration, 34 BERK. J. OF INT’L L. 1 (2015). 
59 Id. at 9–18. 
60 Id. at 22. 
61 Id. at 6, 53. 
62 Id. at 6. 
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the law of the people, was shaped around the establishment of written 
principles meant to guide the actions of the governed as well as the 
government. The most far-reaching and comprehensive code established 
on the continent in this vein was the Napoleonic Code, which emerged in 
1804.63 That Code served as the basis for many other European Codes, 
both on the continent and among the former European colonies.64 
Common law also has its roots in Roman law.65 However, England, 
where common law emerged, chose not to follow the continental model of 
establishing written codes to guide practice.66 Rather, England followed a 
model that empowered magistrates to make determinations on a case-by-
case basis, with the understanding that many of those decisions would 
establish a body of precedent to bind judges in similar cases in the future.67 
This model was far more adaptable and responsive to issues of the day 
than was civil law, which required the work of legislators to change the 
law. 
1. Common Law: A Short History 
Common law is rooted in the concept of freedom of contract.68 Parties 
are free to enter into contracts for any legal purpose that suits them, and 
courts loath to involve themselves in those private transactions. In an 1890 
case in the California Supreme Court, Judge Paterson said, “the greatest 
liberty of making contracts is essential to the business interests of the 
country. In general, the parties must look out for themselves.”69 
Common law was established in England following the Norman 
Conquest of 1066, though some elements of what we today associate with 
                                                                                                             
63 For an interesting explanation of the value of the Code in civil law, see Guy Canivet, 
French Civil Law Between Past and Revival, 51 LOY. L. REV. 39 (2005). 
64 Kensie Kim, Mixed Systems in Legal Origins Analysis, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 693, 718 
(2010) (asserting that most civil law countries were modeled on the Napoleonic Code, with 
the notable exception of countries of Roman-Dutch origin). 
65 See generally T.F.T. Plucknett, The Relations Between Roman Law and English 
Common Law down to the Sixteenth Century: A General Survey, 3 U. OF TORONTO L.J. 24 
(1939). 
66 See Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law World, 
25 YALE J. INT’L L. 435, 471 (2000). 
67 See Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, 
103 YALE L.J. 1651 (1994). 
68 See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A 
Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551, 1621 (2003) (contending that the flexibility 
on common law contracts encouraged economic efficiency and more freedom to contract 
among parties); Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private 
Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Consideration and Form,” 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94 (2000) 
(debating the role of the judiciary in protecting or preventing freedom in the contracting 
process). 
69 Colton v. Stanford, 82 Cal. 351, 398 (1890). 
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common law existed prior to this time.70 Magistrates traveled around 
circuits throughout England to hold court and they carried the decisions of 
other courts with them. Decisions that were considered local or customary 
were largely ignored, but those that appeared “common” among different 
jurisdictions were said to establish precedent and were applied in 
subsequent cases. 
King Henry II officially institutionalized the concept of common law 
in 1154.71 He sent judges from the King’s Court to hear disputes around 
the country, and they would reconvene to share decisions and establish a 
written record of those decisions. Eventually, the prior system of allowing 
local laws and customs to govern local disputes fell away, and a national 
system of stare decisis was created. 
One of the most useful facets of the common law, with respect to 
business, is its adaptability. Unlike civil law, which is constrained by the 
will of the legislature and the ability of legislators to quickly react to 
practical events, the common law need only take a single instance of 
perceived injustice to a court to secure a decision that will have an 
immediate impact on practice. Justice Brandeis famously quipped, “in 
most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled 
than that it be settled right.”72 Forming a contract in a common law 
jurisdiction requires the satisfaction of certain elements. However, in 
contrast to civil law jurisdictions (discussed below), common law courts 
are more willing to find a contract in the absence of certain formalities. 
“The common law, as commonly understood, is notoriously 
ineffective in protecting those who rely to their detriment in anticipation 
of a contract which fails to materialize.”73 Consider the famous common 
law case of Embry v. McKittrick Dry Goods Company.74 There, an 
employee who had been with the company for some years reached the end 
of his employment contract period. He approached the owner of the 
company and asked whether he should look for other work or stay on under 
                                                                                                             
70 See, e.g., JOHN HUDSON, THE FORMATION OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW: LAW AND 
SOCIETY IN ENGLAND FROM THE NORMAN CONQUEST TO MAGNA CARTA 20–21 (1996); see 
also JOHN HUDSON, THE FORMATION OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW: LAW AND SOCIETY IN 
ENGLAND FROM THE NORMAN CONQUEST TO MAGNA CARTA 20–21 (1996); R.C. VAN 
CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 33 (2d ed. 1988). 
71 See, e.g., HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE 
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 457 (1983); PAUL BRAND, “Multis Vigiliis Excogitatam et 
Inventam”: Henry II and the Creation of the English Common Law, in THE MAKING OF 
THE COMMON LAW 77, 78 (1992). 
72 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
73 Ben McFarlane, The Problem of Pre-contractual Reliance: Three Ways to a Third 
Way 2 (Oct. 11, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with New York School of Law). 
74 Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777 (1907). 
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a new contract. The owner, who apparently was too busy at the time to be 
bothered with formalities, told Embry: “Go ahead, you’re all right. Get 
your men out, and don’t let that worry you.” Embry continued working 
without a formal contract. Three months later, he was discharged, and he 
brought suit. The court concluded that a contract exists when there is an 
expressed manifestation of intent to be bound by a contract: “The inner 
intention of parties to a conversation subsequently alleged to create a 
contract cannot either make a contract of what transpired, or prevent one 
from arising, if the words used were sufficient to constitute a contract.”75 
The outward expression of party intent is generally what creates 
liability for contract in common law jurisdictions.76 However, common 
law courts are willing to find contractual liability, not necessarily pre-
contractual liability, for statements or actions taken prior to the 
confirmatory language. Much of the distinction between these two devices 
relates to the common law court’s role in the enforcement of promises. 
As noted above, freedom of contract is at the heart of common law 
contracts. The laissez-faire approach to economic policy introduced in the 
late-18th century spilled over into the field of contract law, leaving 
government and the regulatory system largely out of private contract 
matters.77 Beginning with early U.S. cases, such as Seixas v. Woods in 
1804,78 U.S. courts have defaulted to a rule of caveat emptor (“buyer 
beware”) in contract transactions, though this trend is changing.79 In the 
Seixas case, a buyer was guaranteed a certain type of wood in a contract, 
but he failed to conduct an inspection of that wood at the time of the 
exchange.80 Later, after realizing that he was given the incorrect type of 
                                                                                                             
75 Id. at 779. 
76 See, e.g., Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E. 2d 516 (1954); see also Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City 
Bank of New York, 200 Fed. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). see also, Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 
729 S.W.2d 768, 788-89 (1987), in which the court found that: 
Several factors have been articulated to help determine whether the parties intended to be 
bound only by a formal, signed writing: (1) whether a party expressly reserved the right to 
be bound only when a written agreement is signed; (2) whether there was any partial 
performance by one party that the party disclaiming the contract accepted; (3) whether all 
essential terms of the alleged contract had been agreed upon; and (4) whether the 
complexity or magnitude of the transaction was such that a formal, executed writing would 
normally be expected . . . 
77 See Carolyn Edwards, Freedom of Contract and Fundamental Fairness for Individual 
Parties: The Tug of War Continues, 77 UMKC L. REV. 647, 652 (2009) (explaining that 
courts in the early 19th century sought to preserve market growth by protecting freedom of 
contract). 
78 Seixas v. Woods, 2 Cai. R. 48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804). 
79 See Nicole W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During Pre-Contractual 
Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 70 (1993) (arguing that courts are increasingly 
looking to principles of good faith and reliance in commercial contracts). 
80 Seixas, 2 Cai. R. at 54. 
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wood, he sued, but the court refused to assist him and placed the burden 
on the parties to contract to ensure compliance with the terms of the deal.81 
Undoubtedly, the concept of caveat emptor has significantly evolved 
in the American common law system.82 Today, many types of contracts 
require parties to disclose certain information during a negotiation 
regardless of whether the other party requests it.83 These situations include 
when a party negligently misrepresents a material fact during a contract 
negotiation;84 dangerous conditions not discoverable by a buyer in a 
property transaction;85 or where a party with knowledge is aware that a 
buyer has false information to a transaction and the seller takes no steps to 
correct the mistake.86 However, in the absence of an agreement to disclose 
and these narrow areas of law, most other contractual transactions bear no 
duty of candor in common law contracts, leaving the parties largely on 
their own to conduct their due diligence.87 
During the contract negotiation process in common law, the parties 
are most often treated as uncommitted and at-risk for any loss that might 
occur from failure to conclude a contract.88 “Common law judges have 
always taken what I have called an aleatory view of negotiations; a party 
that enters negotiations hoping to gain from a resulting contract bears the 
risk of any loss that would be incurred if the other party breaks off the 
negotiations.”89 Outside the case of estoppel or misrepresentation, a 
common law “party to pre-contractual negotiations, may break off the 
                                                                                                             
81 See Colton v. Stanford, 82 Cal. 351, 398 (1890) (“[T]he greatest liberty of making 
contracts is essential to the business interests of the country. In general, the parties must 
look out for themselves.”); Swinton v. Whitinsville Sav. Bank, 42 N.E. 2d 808 (1942) (“A 
vendor of real property has no duty to disclose to a prospective purchaser the fact of a latent 
termite condition in the premises.”). But see, Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1983) 
(limiting the doctrine of caveat emptor in certain real property transactions in California). 
82 See Howard Johnson, Caveat Venditor (Let the Seller Beware), 27 MANAGERIAL L. 1, 
2–3 (1985) (explaining the shift toward consumer protection taking place in the mid-20th 
century). 
83 See Palmieri, supra note 79. 
84 See Asleson v. West Branch Land Co., 311 N.W.2d 533, 535 (N.D. 1981) 
85 State v. Brooks, 658 A.2d 22, 24–26 (Vt. 1995) (finding a seller liable where he failed 
to disclose a defect in the property that he was aware was dangerous and that ultimately 
killed the buyer). 
86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
87 See William B. Goldfarb, Fraud and Nondisclosure in the Vendor-Purchaser 
Relation, 8 WEST. RES. L. REV. 5, 13 (1956); W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 106, at 737 (5th ed. 1984). 
88 See Juliet P. Kostirtsky, Uncertainty, Reliance, Preliminary Negotiations and the 
Holdup Problem, 61 SMU L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2008) (explaining the problem of 
uncertainty in contract negotiation). 
89 E. Allan Farnsworth, Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under the UNIDROIT 
Principles, Relevant International Conventions, and National Laws, 3 TUL. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 47, 57 (1995). 
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negotiations at any time and for any reason, including no reason at all, and 
face no liability.”90 This is not the case in civil law jurisdictions. 
2. Civil Law: A Short History 
Though there are many variations of civil law, this section will focus 
on the most widespread, which is the Napoleonic Code.91 Book III of the 
Napoleonic Code addresses the law of commercial obligations, which will 
be the focus of this analysis.92 
Civil law is based upon the theory that the state should have a key role 
to play in the administration of justice and the determination of appropriate 
public policy. Legislators decide what the law should be, and government 
administrators (regulators) apply the law.93 Though far less adaptable than 
the common law, civil law boasts a great deal of predictability and 
transparency.94 The law is not decided through interpretation in the courts 
after it is enacted—it is decided in advance by the legislature. 
Predictability is no doubt a good feature for commercial transactions.95 
Knowing what the law is can lend clarity to a transaction that might be rife 
with business risk. Civil law, in this sense, can help mitigate some 
transactional risk by eliminating the third-party interpretation associated 
with the courts in common law jurisdictions. However, predictability 
comes with potential risk for parties that prefer to consider multiple 
options for their contractual endeavors before settling on a final choice. As 
we will see below, civil law is less forgiving of parties that make promises 
without following through on them. 
French law has similar contract formation requirements to those of 
common law jurisdictions.96 Clear and certain intent to be bound by the 
                                                                                                             
90 R.J.P. Kottenhagen, From Freedom of Contract to Forcing Parties to Agreement: On 
the Consequences of Breaking off Negotiations in Different Legal Systems, 12 IUS 
GENTIUM, J. OF THE U. OF BALT. CTR. FOR INT’L AND COMP. L. 58, 73 (2006). 
91 Two key variations of the civil law are the Germanic Code and the Scandinavian 
Code; however, differences between common and civil law are far more substantial than 
differences among the variations of civil law. 
92 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. (Fr.). 
93 See Max Rheinstein, Common Law and Civil Law: An Elementary Comparison, 22 
REVISTA JURIDICA DE LA U. DE PUERTO RICO 90 (1952). 
94 See Ken Adams, Civil-Law Drafting Compared to Common-Law Drafting (Nov. 24, 
2006), http://www.adamsdrafting.com/civil-law-and-common-law-drafting/ (defining 
civil law as more predictable given the number of statutes on contracts). 
95 See, e.g., Stefanie A. Lindquist and Frank C. Cross, Stability, Predictability and the 
Rule of Law: Stare Decisis as a Reciprocity Norm, U. TEXAS WORKING PAPER, 
https://law.utexas.edu/conferences/measuring/The%20Papers/Rule%20of%20Law%20Co
nference.crosslindquist.pdf. But see, Ofer Raban, The Fallacy of Legal Certainty: Why 
Vague Legal Standards may be Better for Capitalism and Liberalism, 19 PUB. INTEREST L. 
J. 175 (2010). 
96 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1112-1 (Fr.). 
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parties’ stated terms as well as stipulation of essential contract terms are 
required to form a valid contract.97 A significant difference exists between 
the two systems with respect to the need for consideration.98 In civil law, 
the contract formation process is clear and defined, with certain elements, 
depending on the type of contract, required by law. These formalities make 
the line between a potential contract and an actual contract relatively thin. 
As noted in the previous section, in the common law, the lack of such 
formalities led to the need for consideration—valuable exchange—to 
prove that the parties meant to actually form a contract.99 
PERCEIVED LEGAL RISKS FOR ENTREPRENEURS 
Pre-contractual liability exists when a party engaged in the negotiation 
of a contract faces monetary or equitable damages for actions that took 
place prior to the formation of the contract, regardless of whether the 
contract was executed or not. As discussed above, pre-contractual liability 
can pose a significant risk to parties that might be interested in 
investigating avenues for the successful conclusion of a contract but 
ultimately choose to go a different way. The more predictable this risk is, 
the less likely it will pose a barrier to the potential negotiation process.100 
This section discusses four of the most common areas of legal risk for 
pre-contractual acts: lesion, Good Faith, Duty to Disclose and Reliance. 
What will become clear from this discussion is that all remedies across 
both legal systems are highly limited to specific circumstances; however, 
what will also be clear is the variety of mechanisms available in civil law 
jurisdictions and the dearth of such options in common law jurisdictions. 
We will begin with the doctrine of lesion. 
1. Civil Equity: The Doctrine of Lesion 
One of the significant distinctions between common law and civil law 
is the ability of a common law court to create its own equitable remedies 
for a particular case. This practice inserts a great deal of unpredictability 
into any commercial transaction and poses a significant legal and financial 
                                                                                                             
97 PAULA GILIKER, PRE-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH LAW 3 
(Kluwer Law International, 2002) (“le contrat est une convention par laquelle une ou 
plusieurs personnes s’obligent, envers une ou plusieurs autres, à donner, à faire ou à ne pas 
faire quelque chose.” (“a contract is a convention which binds one or more persons, 
towards another or several others, to give, to do, or not to do something.”)) 
98 See Fandl, supra note 58, at 11–12 (explaining the lack of a requirement for 
consideration in civil law contracts). 
99 Fandl, supra note 58 (outlining the history of the need for consideration in common 
law contracts). 
100 Kostirsky, supra note 88. 
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risk to parties. In most instances, civil law commercial transactions avoid 
this risk.101 However, there are a few established equitable remedies in 
civil law that, while not unpredictable, do provide parties with potentially 
unexpected results. 
Civil law is more likely to impose liability on parties earlier in the 
negotiation process than common law.102 This can mean pre-contractual 
documents, such as comfort letters, are used as evidence to bind parties in 
the event of a dispute over final contract terms or execution.103 One of the 
public policy reasons for this increased willingness to make parties liable 
for their pre-contractual assertions is the strong protections that statutes 
have historically provided for consumers and parties in less powerful 
bargaining positions.104 The doctrine of lesion is one of the most 
significant examples of this policy.105 
French law favors enforcement. To the French, “the creation [in the 
commercial world] of a meaningless instrument is unthinkable.”106 Part of 
the reason for the civil law tilt toward enforcing pre-contractual promises 
is the judicial examination of party intent. “Article 1156 dictates that the 
jurist seek ‘the common intention of the contracting parties rather than stop 
at the mere literal sense of language.’”107 
Lesion is the civil law concept that originally allowed a party to void 
a contract in which they would receive less than half the value of the 
property to be transferred to them.108 The goal behind the original concept, 
known as lasesio enormis, was to protect landowners from being exploited 
by wealthier landowners.109 The concept grew from application to 
                                                                                                             
101 Changes to commercial transaction rules in civil law countries are made by legislation, 
not by judicial decree. See, e.g., Changes to French Contract Law are Now in Effect: Are 
you Prepared?, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS, https://www.squirepattonboggs.com/~/media/files
/insights/publications/2016/10/changes-to-french-contract-law-are-now-in-effect-are-you-
prepared/24784changestofrenchcontractlawalert.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2019) 
(describing the new French law on contracts, which includes the equitable remedy of 
specific performance). 
102 DiMatteo, supra note 40, at 126. 
103 Id. 
104 See Gabriela Gheorgiu, et. al, Consumer Protection in Relation with the European 
Business Environment, 11 EUROPEAN SCI. J. 112, 113 (2015) (describing the European 
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immovable property to movable property during early European times as 
a concept of “commutative justice.”110 
Originating in the Middle Ages, the notion of inequality 
of consideration is now codified in article 1647 of the 
French Civil Code: ‘If the price of an immovable object 
is inadequate by more than seven-twelfths, the seller has 
the right to demand rescission of the sale.’ This is true 
even if the seller had renounced her right to rescission in 
writing. The right of rescission gives the purchaser two 
options: to return the item or to pay ‘the balance of the 
just price.’ Unlike the just price theories of the Middle 
Ages, the purchaser does not have a right of rescission if 
she has paid more than one and seven-twelfths the item’s 
value. Thus, under European law, a bid or offer letter to 
purchase at a below-market price may be subject to 
rescission or reformation.111 
By the time of Napoleon, great consternation over the expanded lesion 
concept had arisen within the business community. Valuing movable 
property and thus determining when the amount was less than half of that 
value became a subject of dispute.112 When Napoleon issued his Code in 
1804, he included the original lesion concept, which allowed a remedy for 
a party that received less than half of the value of immovable property 
only.113 This is the same concept that applies in most civil law countries 
today; however, no such concept exists in common law.114 
2. Good Faith 
[Good faith is] simply a rechristening of fundamental 
principles of contract law.115 
Good faith . . . is best understood as an ‘excluder’—it is a 
phrase which has no general meaning or meanings of its 
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own, but which serves to exclude many heterogeneous 
forms of bad faith.116 
In both common and civil law, we often discuss the concept of good 
faith.117 This phrase gives us comfort that, if a party undermines the 
negotiation, we will have some sort of remedy at law. Yet the results of 
such cases widely vary depending on whether it is in a common or civil 
law jurisdiction. 
Good faith is an amorphous concept that has been applied in both civil 
and common law jurisdictions to circumstances in which the law is unable 
or unwilling to provide a remedy, yet the interest of justice demands one. 
It is associated with concepts such as justice, fairness, and honesty in 
dealing.118 In the case of pre-contractual liability, good faith can refer to 
situations in which parties were held liable for their statements made 
during the negotiation process that created expectations by the other party. 
It is important to note at the outset of our good faith discussion that a 
significant difference exists between good faith in the negotiation process 
and good faith in the performance of a contract. The latter is required in 
both common and civil law jurisdictions; however, the former is required 
only in civil law.119 
a. Good Faith in the Civil Law 
The principle of good faith in performance originated in Roman 
law.120 This principle was subsequently adopted by the business 
community, the lex mercatoria, to facilitate compliance with contractual 
promises made between parties.121 Modern civil law codifies the concept 
of bona fides (good faith) in their respective codes.122 
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The concept of good faith in civil law is broadly interpreted: 
The difference between civil law and common . . . is that 
the latter system accepts that good faith is not only the 
opposite of bad faith and a principle of honesty; it is also 
an independent legal category, which can be used to 
create rules. The . . . Dutch good faith principle 
encourages parties to consider each other’s interests, even 
before a contract is signed.123 
The broad civil law interpretation—applying good faith to the 
negotiation as well as the performance of contracts—stands in stark 
contrast to the narrower and limited common law version, discussed 
below. 
Pre-contractual liability in civil law can be traced back to Jhering, the 
German scholar, in 1865.124 Jhering put together the doctrine of culpa in 
contrahendo, or fault in negotiating.125 He contended that there are many 
circumstances in German case law in which a party, prior to formation of 
a contract, was negatively impacted because of the “blameworthy” 
conduct of the other party to the negotiation.126 This blameworthy conduct 
included a party enticing another party toward a contract with objective 
knowledge of an impossibility to its formation. It also included a buyer 
who inadvertently orders 100 widgets rather than the 10 they intended and 
would not be liable to reimburse the seller for the transport costs for return 
of the excess widgets.127 
Jhering was referring to the concept of bad faith in negotiating and 
believed that a remedy should exist in civil law to account for this inequity. 
Subsequent modifications to the German civil code facilitated a resolution 
by imposing the concept of reliance on negotiating parties.128 Following 
these modifications to the civil code, parties are able to recover in a 
number of pre-contractual cases: when a party is injured upon entering a 
store or restaurant; when a party expends resources to visit a house for sale 
despite the seller having already sold it (and not disclosing that fact); or a 
party with a duty to disclose giving erroneous information.129 
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It is important to note that the injured party in these cases is not entitled 
to expectation damages, because it would presuppose the existence of a 
contract. Rather, the injured party may seek reliance damages amounting 
to the extent of their loss resulting from actions taken in reliance on the 
promises of the blameworthy party. 
The requirement to negotiate a contract in good faith exists throughout 
European civil codes. The oldest instance of this requirement is in the 
Italian civil code. The commentary to that section of the code stipulates 
parties must negotiate, “always bearing in mind the purpose that the 
contract is intended to satisfy, the harmony of the interests of the parties, 
and the superior interests of the nation requiring productive 
cooperation.”130 A recent review of Italian case law applying this principle 
of good faith in cases of pre-contractual liability explains how this concept 
works in practice: 
Italian case law now universally acknowledges that the 
notions of good faith and fairness are expressions of the 
general principle of social solidarity recognized by the 
Italian Constitution, and that they refer to specific 
obligations that apply both during contract negotiations 
and during the performance of contracts. These 
obligations are in addition to any other contractual duty 
already binding on the parties; in the event of their 
infringement, the aggrieved party is entitled to claim 
damages. It is also generally accepted that public policy 
imposes the requirement of good faith in all dealings (Art 
1175 of the Civil Code) and during the pre-contractual 
stage (Art 1337 of the Civil Code).131 
Pre-contractual liability in Italy can exist even if a contract is 
ultimately concluded between the parties, so long as there is a showing of 
breach of good faith during the negotiations. A seminal case on this matter, 
from the Italian high court, involved a farmer who applied to the national 
utility company for access to electricity for his irrigation system.132 The 
utility company took 18 months to begin providing electricity (thereby 
executing the contract) and the farmer sued for damages caused by the 
delayed service. The Court held that, “the conclusion of the contract does 
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not render irrelevant the behaviour contrary to good faith during the 
formation of a contract.”133 
In addition to this principle of Italian law, a second, and potentially 
more serious risk, for foreign investors in Italy is the law on 
disadvantageous contracts.134 This article of the Italian civil code provides 
a remedy for a party who, due to misleading or incorrect information 
provided during the contract negotiation, suffers a loss.135 The following 
two cases exemplify this principle. 
In the first case, an investor purchased shares in a reputable Italian 
bank.136 The investor made the purchase because of information found in 
the bank’s prospectus. However, that information was misleading, and the 
investor ultimately paid more than the fair market value for the shares. The 
court concluded that this was a violation of the good faith duty that led to 
a disadvantage for the buyer. The buyer was compensated the difference 
between the price paid and the market value of the shares. 
The second case involved a buyer of an industrial machine.137 During 
the contract negotiation, the seller informed the buyer that a government 
tax benefit would provide the buyer with a 33% rebate on his purchase. 
However, at the time the statement was made, unbeknownst to the seller, 
that subsidy expired. No mention of the subsidy appeared in the sales 
agreement, and the contract was concluded. When the buyer sued for 
compensation, the court again found bad faith and a disadvantageous 
contract. The buyer was awarded an amount equivalent to 33% of the 
contract price.138 
An important lesson from these cases regarding disadvantageous 
contracts is that the remedy ultimately integrates the points made pre-
contractually into the final contract: 
[T]he remedy for such a specific violation of good faith 
makes the pre-contractual information given by one party 
to the other legally binding as terms of the agreement: the 
party providing information is bound to perform in 
accordance with what was said, regardless of his or her 
intentions, aims and awareness.139 
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And though no specific remedy for breach of good faith in contract 
negotiations has been established by the Italian civil code,140 the fact that 
the code specifically creates liability for such breaches should place 
foreign investors on notice. The high court in Italy said in 2007 that, “the 
extent of pre-contractual liability cannot be precisely predetermined.”141 
This is not a comforting assessment. 
In their 2009 comparison of Dutch and American real estate contracts, 
Van der Veen and Korthals use a famous Dutch case as an example of the 
civil law application of good faith.142 In that case, a real estate developer 
was in the midst of negotiating a development contract with a community 
to build a swimming pool.143 The developer drafted a proposal that was 
sent to the community, and they were given assurances that they would be 
awarded the contract. However, the community instead chose to use the 
developer’s proposal to solicit a bid from a third party, which it ultimately 
accepted. The developer sued and, despite the lack of a formal contract, 
recovered significant equitable damages, including the costs for preparing 
the proposal and expectation damages, a concept familiar to common law 
practitioners. “In Dutch law, good faith is used to bridge the gap that the 
adversary model of contract law assumes to exist between parties by 
stipulating that parties must attend to each other’s interests.”144 
The duty to negotiate in good faith, while non-existent in common law 
jurisdictions, is frequently applied in civil law jurisdictions, despite a lack 
of statutory guidance in many instances.145 Pre-contractual liability for 
failure to negotiate in good faith had already been codified in Italy146 and 
Germany.147 However, French law is one example in which the statute had 
been silent as to the requirement for good faith in contract negotiations, 
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then French courts filled that silence with consistent interpretations of the 
code that applied good faith requirements to negotiations in French law.148 
A 2016 change to the French civil code added a requirement that 
parties to a contract negotiation negotiate in good faith.149 The original 
French code did not expressly mention good faith in the negotiation of a 
contract, only in the performance of that contract.150 However, French 
courts generally extended the duty to pre-contractual negotiations as well 
as contract performance. The new law codifies this practice by establishing 
liability for bad faith in the negotiation process: 
Art. 1104. Contracts must be negotiated, formed and 
performed in good faith. This provision is a matter of 
public policy. 
Art. 1112. The commencement, continuation and 
breaking-off of pre-contractual negotiations are free from 
control. They must mandatorily satisfy the requirements 
of good faith.151 
The concept of freedom of contract exists in European civil law as 
well; however, government intervention, often on behalf of consumers, 
has limited the scope of this freedom.152 Similarly, 
The Dutch Supreme Court has held that parties must act 
in accord with ‘reasonableness and equity’ in negotiating 
a contract. As such, each party must take into account the 
reasonable interests of the other. In forcing this duty, a 
court may order a party to either proceed with or resume 
the negotiations or pay damages for breaking off 
negotiations. Most surprisingly, damages may be based 
on the injured party’s expectation interest. If a contract 
was sufficiently close to conclusion, a party’s expectation 
interest may include profits that would have been made 
had the envisaged contract been performed. No common 
law judge could conceive of such a result.153 
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The good faith principle is at the heart of the precontractual liability 
discussion. The point at which liability attaches, and the extent of that 
liability, can tremendously alter the risk faced by negotiating parties. 
French, Dutch and German law impose liability on parties that break off a 
contract negotiation in bad faith. Such damages are similar to reliance 
damages in common law courts, which allow for reimbursement of the 
reasonable expenditures leading up to the termination.154 However, 
damages for breach of good faith in contract negotiations has no equivalent 
in common law.155 
b. Good Faith in the Common Law 
Contrast that Dutch case with a similar example under common law, 
discussed in more detail in the next section, in which the court expressly 
rejected the concept of good faith in negotiations as “repugnant” to the 
adversarial nature of contract negotiations: 
[T]he concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good 
faith is inherently repugnant to the adversarial position of 
the parties when involved in negotiations. Each party to 
the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her) own 
interest, so long as he avoids making 
misrepresentations . . . .A duty to negotiate in good faith 
is as unworkable in practice as it is inherently inconsistent 
with the position of a negotiating party.156 
The principle that good faith does not apply to a contract negotiation 
in common law is rooted in the belief that parties are free to make and 
break commitments prior to the execution of a contract and to pursue 
multiple parties in the quest for the best possible outcome. This seemingly 
underhanded and shady type of dealing is not necessarily how contracts 
are negotiated in commercial practice.157 However, should a party not act 
in good faith in the process of negotiation, common law courts would 
unlikely impose liability on that party. 
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The requirement to perform a contract in good faith has been a staple 
concept of the common law for at least 200 years.158 More recently, it has 
been codified in the Uniform Commercial Code.159 However, in both case 
law and code, it is quite evident that this duty applies to the performance 
stage of the contract and not to the negotiation stage.160 
The duty of good faith in the common law has its roots in freedom of 
contract. Courts are careful to give weight only to what parties chose to 
include in their contracts and take few liberties in interpreting beyond the 
language of the contract itself. This aligns with the general policy that 
parties are free to negotiate any terms they find agreeable, so long as they 
do not violate the law.161 There are exceptions to this general policy, such 
as public services and utilities, which must be provided to anyone who 
requests them without discrimination; however, these exceptions are 
limited and do not carry over to most commercial contracts.162 
“We have not yet reached the stage, where the selection of a trader’s 
customers is made for him by the government.”163 This quote, from a 1915 
Court of Appeals decision in New York, reflects the strong protection in 
common law courts for the freedom of contract. Shortly after this case, the 
Lochner era of regulation began in which courts largely refused 
government attempts to intervene, even if the contract disadvantaged 
workers.164 And while we saw an increased penchant for common law 
courts to intervene in some contract areas—such as labor practices,165 
discriminatory practices,166 and environmental protection167—the general 
principle of freedom of contract remains as strong as ever. 
Accordingly, the common law will not restrict the freedom of parties 
to enter into and subsequently withdraw from contract negotiations 
without liability.168 This freedom encourages more active engagement in 
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potential deal-making and can incentivize parties to take more risks.169 
However, the line between a negotiation and a preliminary agreement is 
often thin. 
Agreement on essential terms of a contract, even in the absence of 
definiteness, may be interpreted by both common and civil law courts as a 
complete contract. Courts in both jurisdictions are usually willing to fill-
in the gaps to complete a contract so long as there is clear evidence of the 
parties’ intent to be bound by the existing terms.170 171 And while this will 
not turn one party’s notion of an agreement into a binding contract in most 
cases, minor uncertainties will not prevent a court from refusing 
enforcement.172 
Similar to other common law jurisdictions, the United States confines 
the protection of good faith principles to the performance of the contract. 
Section 1-304 of Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) (formerly section 1-
203) stipulates: “Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an 
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.”173 The 
comment to that section explicitly limits the scope of application for the 
doctrine of good faith in U.S. law. It states that the UCC: 
does not support an independent cause of action for failure 
to perform or enforce in good faith . . . .The doctrine of 
good faith merely directs a court towards interpreting 
contracts within the commercial context in which they are 
created, performed, and enforced, and does not create a 
separate duty of fairness and reasonableness which can be 
independently breached.174 
Similarly, the Restatement of Contracts, which is a compilation of key 
principles extracted from common law precedent, establishes a duty of 
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good faith. However, this duty is expressly limited to the performance 
period of the contract, thus establishing no pre-contractual liability: 
“Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”175 However, the 
comments to the Restatement also make abundantly clear that this section, 
as is the case with UCC section 1-304, does not apply to the negotiation 
phase of the contract: 
Good faith in negotiation. This Section, like Uniform 
Commercial Code § 1-[304], does not deal with good 
faith in the formation of a contract. Bad faith in 
negotiation, although not within the scope of this Section, 
may be subject to sanctions. Particular forms of bad faith 
in bargaining are the subjects of rules as to capacity to 
contract, mutual assent and consideration and of rules as 
to invalidating causes such as fraud and duress.176 
It is important to note, as the comment above suggests, that other 
provisions within U.S. law may ultimately apply similar concepts as those 
found within the civil law. For instance, UCC Section 2-302, which 
provides a remedy for parties subjected to an unconscionable clause within 
a contract.177 However, a number of cases show the narrow application of 
this clause and its inapplicability to pre-contractual negotiations. 178 
Common law courts have been very clear in their refusal to apply good 
faith principles to contract negotiations, except for very limited 
circumstances,179 or when the parties expressly agree to an obligation to 
negotiate in good faith.180 There is no statutory or general case-based 
requirement to negotiate contracts in good faith, leaving the parties to 
determine if and when to break-off the negotiation.181 
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180 See SIGA Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene Inc., 67 A.3d 330, 343–44 (Del. 2013) (“[A]n 
express contractual obligation to negotiate in good faith is binding on the contracting 
parties”). 
181 See Robert Coyne and Kevin Evans, Non-binding Preliminary Agreements: Use 
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3. Duty to Disclose/ Misrepresentation 
Closely related to the concept of good faith is the duty to disclose 
information in a contract negotiation. Both common law and civil law 
establish some obligation of the parties to disclose material facts that 
would have a substantial impact on the ignorant party’s decision to enter 
the contract at all.182 Consider the following case:183 
Organ (Buyer) and Girault (Seller) were negotiating over the 
commercial sale of tobacco in the United States during the War of 1812 
when ports were blocked for trade. While considering the final terms of 
the sale, Organ received information from his brother who had been with 
the British fleet that the War was over, and the port would be reopened. 
Organ did not disclose this information to Girault but instead immediately 
accepted the offer and purchased the tobacco. When news broke the next 
day, the price of tobacco increased substantially. 
Girault sued Organ contending that the latter had a duty to disclose 
information that would have had a material effect on their negotiation. 
Chief Justice Marshall disagreed and, in a brief opinion, found that Organ 
had no duty to disclose.184 Since that case, common law courts have 
vacillated on whether to impose a duty to disclose. No clear guidance 
exists in the common law pointing to when this duty arises, absent a 
statute. 
However, in a thorough analysis of caselaw in the United States 
regarding duties to disclose, Zeiler and Krawiec found that such a duty is 
more likely to be imposed where: 1) the defect to be disclosed was latent; 
2) the information would update or correct previous disclosures; 3) full 
disclosure is often required when the parties have a fiduciary or 
confidential relationship; 4) illegally or tortuously-acquired information 
exists; and 5) the uninformed party is a buyer or lessee.185 They also found 
that courts had more sympathy for uninformed parties who are sick, 
disabled, illiterate or elderly.186 And interestingly, unlike in civil law 
systems, the authors found that common law courts are not more likely to 
require disclosure when the parties are of unequal bargaining power.187 
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Civil law takes a much stricter view of the duty to disclose, placing an 
onus on the party with information to share that information if it is 
necessary or proper to the uninformed party’s decision-making process. 
The 2016 modified French law establishes a strict duty to inform (disclose) 
during the contract negotiation.188 While this duty already existed for 
certain consumer transactions, this modification turns that duty into a 
general obligation to disclose any information that has a direct and 
necessary link to the contract. The law establishes liability for a party that 
fails to disclose necessary information in the course of contract 
negotiations and may allow a right of contract rescission if a contract was 
ultimately agreed upon. 
While no-one can predict with certainty how the courts 
will develop some of these concepts, the recent 
codification in this area cries out for parties to ‘dress up’ 
and define the rules of courtship for prospective 
commercial partnerships. Where negotiations sour, or 
subsequent contractual performance disappoints, a failure 
to dress up may lead to downsides much greater than 
simply not holding on to your new partner.189 
Finally, the new French law also imposes a general obligation of 
confidentiality on the contract negotiation process.190 By establishing 
liability for the disclosure to third parties of information obtained in the 
course of the negotiation without authorization, parties are more restricted 
in their ability to bargain between potential contract partners, playing 
terms off of one another. This creates a new era of transparency in the 
negotiation process while adding risk to the foreign investor hoping to 
withhold information or bargain with multiple parties in the interest of 
securing the best possible deal. 
4. Reliance 
In the absence of an agreement on material terms and a clear showing 
of intent to be bound, common law courts rarely provide a remedy to a 
party for commitments made during pre-contractual negotiations. The 
costs associated with negotiating and preparing for the potential 
eventuality of a contract are treated as sunk costs in the vast majority of 
cases. Reliance is one exception to this rule. It is a precontractual remedy 
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found in exceptional cases that go far beyond a basic negotiation.191 The 
Restatement of Contracts explains that reliance is predicated upon 
inducement into an agreement that fails to satisfy formal contract norms 
and causes economic harm to the induced party.192 
In common law, reliance is typically applied in cases where some 
contract performance has already occurred under the guise of a quasi-
contract. This may allow for recovery of expenses incurred following the 
acceptance of an offer to hire a performer who backs out before the 
performance,193 making a bid based upon the bids of sub-contractors that 
were ultimately rescinded,194 or where a distributor awarded a franchise 
license to a party despite that distributor lacking the power to do so.195 
Unlike most precontractual cases, each of these cases involves some 
degree of contract performance. 
The Red Owl v. Hoffman case has long been taught in U.S. law schools 
as evidence of the ability of a party to recover reliance damages for 
preparatory costs associated with contract negotiations.196 It is a case made 
famous not only because of the surprising outcome (awarding damages in 
the absence of any preliminary agreement) but also because of the colorful 
characters in the story. It is important to discuss the case here in some 
detail because it clearly exemplifies the legal analysis behind a claim of 
liability for pre-contractual discussions in the common law. I will briefly 
describe the case below. 
In November 1959, Joseph Hoffman, the owner of a bakery in 
Wautoma, Wisconsin, contacted Sid Jansen at Red Owl Stores to inquire 
about setting-up a franchise. Discussions continued into the following year 
when Edward Lukowitz took over for Jansen. To speed things along, 
Hoffman decided he should get some experience in the grocery business, 
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so he bought a local grocery store for $16,000 in 1961 and advised 
Lukowitz that he was doing this to “get a little experience” before taking 
on a larger business like Red Owl.197 Hoffman ran the store at a profit, and 
Red Owl representatives visited him in 1961. 
Upon seeing Hoffman doing well, Lukowitz urged Hoffman to sell his 
grocery business to his associate, Edward Wrysinski, so that he could free 
up the cash he needed for the Red Owl franchise. Hoffman sold the store 
at a $2,000 profit. Subsequently, Hoffman and Lukowitz jointly identified 
a location for the new store, and Hoffman paid $1,000 for an option to 
purchase a lot there. Red Owl was under the impression that Hoffman 
would be selling his bakery in order to generate the cash to support the 
Red Owl franchise, but Hoffman never intended to sell the bakery and 
instead planned to take out a loan to get the funds needed for the franchise. 
Over the next several months, Hoffman and Red Owl went back and 
forth with a number of financing proposals requiring Hoffman to take out 
a variety of loans, including taking out equity from his bakery, in order to 
free enough cash for the franchise. Red Owl made statements such as, “we 
are ready to go forward,” but still imposed additional barriers to a final 
agreement. By February of 1962, Red Owl had imposed requirements that 
Hoffman was unable to meet, leading Hoffman to withdraw from the 
negotiation and threaten to sue Red Owl for “ill-advice.” 
At a jury trial, Hoffman argued that he relied on the representations 
made by Red Owl and, in so doing, suffered significant economic losses 
by, among other things, selling his grocery store, purchasing a lot for the 
Red Owl store, and selling his bakery building. The jury sided with 
Hoffman and awarded him $20,000 in damages, an amount that included 
the full value of the grocery store. 
Red Owl appealed in 1965 on the issue of whether a party is entitled 
to damages in a preliminary negotiation on the grounds of reliance, or 
promissory estoppel.198 The court began its discussion by citing the 
Restatement of Contracts explanation of promissory estoppel, which says: 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect 
to induce action or forbearance of a definite and 
substantial character on the part of the promisee and 
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding 
if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise.199 
                                                                                                             
197 William C. Whitford & Stewart Macaulay, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores: The Rest of 
the Story, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 801, 810 (2010). 
198 Hoffman, 26 Wis. 2d 683 (1965). 
199 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1933). 
252 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:215 
In referring to a promise, the Restatement is speaking of 
representations made by a party that would induce them to take certain 
actions, which may ultimately be detrimental to them. The court explained 
that if the representation made by the party is too indefinite to be 
considered a promise, it would not support a claim of reliance.200 In this 
case, the California Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that Red 
Owl had made promises to Hoffman that he relied upon and that, despite 
the fact that no manifestation of intent to conclude the contract was made 
clear, Hoffman could reasonably have been expected to rely on those 
promises. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision allowing 
Hoffman to recover damages for reliance on Red Owl’s promises, though 
the final amount awarded was reduced. 
The Red Owl case is significant principally for two things: first, it is a 
novel application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, or reliance, 
which is generally reserved for negotiations that result in a fairly advanced 
preliminary agreement, which was not the case here. And second, it is an 
outlier in our precedential history of pre-contractual liability.201 
In their study of over 100 cases presenting the issue of pre-contractual 
liability between 1999 and 2003, Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott found 
that 87% of those cases resulted in no recovery for losses incurred.202 Only 
cases involving misrepresentation or deceit led to recovery in their sample. 
They concluded, “Courts consistently have denied recovery for pre-
contractual reliance unless the parties, by agreeing on something 
significant, indicated their intention to be bound.”203 Their suggestion is 
that pre-contractual liability in the absence of intent to be bound or fraud 
will not offer recovery to an injured party in a common law jurisdiction. 
5. Revocability of Offers Prior to Acceptance 
This final section regarding remedies briefly explains the issue of 
revocability of an offer prior to acceptance. When an offeror makes an 
offer to an offeree, a period of time may emerge between delivery of the 
offer and acceptance or rejection of that offer. This period is particularly 
dangerous for both parties as it can create unexpected results. If the offeror 
chooses to rescind their offer prior to acceptance, the offeree may suffer 
because they may have taken steps in reliance on that offer that caused 
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them harm, such as refusing other offers or selling assets to acquire 
resources to accept the offer. Yet if the offeree accepts while the offeror is 
in the process of rescinding or after the offeror has had his offer accepted 
by a third party, the offeror may be harmed by the dual exposure. 
The Restatement and associated common law cases place much of the 
power over the acceptance with the offeror rather than the offeree. Once 
an offeror makes an offer, that offeror may rescind their offer at any time 
prior to acceptance by the offeree. This rescission may be made through 
direct communication,204 indirect communication,205 or, if it was a public 
offer, through the same public means used to make the original offer.206 
However, the offeree does have the ability to form a valid contract through 
a variety of mechanisms, such as notifying the offeror,207 mailing an 
acceptance,208 or performance of the terms of the agreement.209 Note that 
the common law and UCC differ with respect to offer and acceptance 
rules, yet both recognize the revocability of the offer prior to acceptance.210 
The most significant distinction is with respect to offers that specify a time 
for acceptance, which are generally temporarily irrevocable under civil 
law but revocable under common law. 
Under French law, for instance, the offeror may not rescind their offer 
for the time specified in that offer or, if a time is not specified, for a 
reasonable period of time.211 In addition, for consumer contracts, a French 
consumer is permitted up to seven days to rescind their acceptance of a 
purchase made from a professional.212 Germany has the strictest law in 
terms of revocability. An offeror has no right to rescind once an offer has 
been made.213 However, an offer under German law terminates after the 
time period specified for acceptance or after a reasonable period of time.214 
And under Dutch law, an offer is revocable at any time unless the offer 
states a period of time for acceptance (similar to French law).215 It is 
important to note here that the Convention on the International Sale of 
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Goods, which applies to commercial sales contracts in many civil and 
some common law countries, splits the difference between these two 
approaches. Offers are revocable any time prior to acceptance unless they 
state a fixed time for acceptance, expressly indicate irrevocability, or it 
would be reasonable to assume the offer was irrevocable.216 
The above discussion above has identified four key areas of risk for 
the unwitting cross-border entrepreneur. They highlight scenarios in 
which a potential common law jurisdiction investor could be at risk for 
liability based upon their precontractual words or deeds, and a potential 
civil law jurisdiction investor at risk for losses stemming from the non-
binding words and deeds of a common law partner. 
C.  Theory 
This section evaluates the relationship between legal tradition and the 
level of entrepreneurial activity in that business environment in an attempt 
to provide some insight into the deterrent effect of the risks discussed 
above. Previous studies that have examined the linkage between common 
law legal environments and more robust economic growth and business 
development have focused their attention on the independence of the 
courts, government involvement in private business matters, and contract 
enforcement.217 And while an entrepreneur undoubtedly considers all of 
these elements at some point in the formation and operation of their 
business, most of them are matters with limited effect on the exploratory 
phase of business development. Effective contract enforcement is essential 
once a business relationship has been established and the entrepreneur 
begins contracting with partners, laborers, suppliers, and so forth. 
Effective judicial institutions are essential for ensuring that the 
entrepreneur has a forum to pursue legal actions against breaching parties, 
tortfeasors and the like.218 This was the central tenet of Nobel Laureate 
Douglass North’s seminal work on the relationship between judicial 
institutions and economic performance.219 
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North’s argument that effective contract enforcement, judicial 
independence, and property rights create an environment that is conducive 
to economic growth over time, is rooted in the perception of security that 
those elements give to potential investors.220 When an investor is confident 
that his or her contract has the weight of law behind it and an efficient 
judiciary to enforce it, its value is significantly enhanced. However, it is 
the absence of government interference in the pre-contractual stages of 
commercial relationships that appears to lubricate the entrepreneurial 
investment environment. During this exploratory stage, investors may 
prefer the flexibility that non-enforceability of pre-contractual agreements 
provide along with the security that a completed contract ensures.221 
The exploratory phase for an entrepreneur may involve discussions 
with potential partners, investors, and staff, existing business owners, 
likely suppliers, and other service providers that will contribute to the 
launch of the new endeavor.222 These discussions may involve certain 
representations about the business or the potential relationship between the 
parties. They may include commitments to take steps toward the 
conclusion of a contract. And they may include promises to work together 
in good faith toward a mutually beneficial goal. 
The immediate legal concern for an entrepreneur operating within this 
exploratory phase may be his or her potential liability for commitments 
made before the business begins operations. In some cases, the 
entrepreneur may make a handful of wise agreements with partners and 
carry them all forward into the launch of the venture. However, for any 
number of reasons, an entrepreneur may terminate negotiations with some 
potential partners or may fail to launch the business at all.223 In those cases, 
is the entrepreneur liable for commitments made to his or her potential 
partners? This question is less easily answered than it may appear and is 
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quite different in common and civil law jurisdictions, and the following 
section explores this issue. 
The contract is at the heart of commercial transactions. Contracts 
underlie transactions such as leasing or buying land or facilities, hiring 
staff, buying supplies and assets, financing the business, and of course, 
interacting with customers and clients, just to name a few. In order to 
assess, as a general matter, which legal tradition provides a more 
hospitable environment for the creation of new businesses, we must 
understand the contract formation process. And while most contracts begin 
with a negotiation phase, not all negotiations lead to a contract. In the 
business context, this period between the negotiation and the contract 
execution is the area of most risk for the potential entrepreneur. 
Negotiating a potential contract requires risk-taking.224 Resources 
must be devoted to the negotiation process, and many potential deals are 
discarded when better deals appear on the horizon.225 An effective 
negotiation is not necessarily the one that ends in a perfect deal; it is the 
one that ends in the best possible deal given the circumstances. Knowing 
this, negotiators may pursue multiple deals simultaneously, sometimes 
leveraging benefits offered by one against a deal offered by another.226 In 
each case, the negotiator is putting the entire deal at risk in the interest of 
securing as much as they can from the other party. But that is not the only 
risk involved in contract negotiations. 
In order to extract promises from another party, contract negotiators 
usually have to make promises themselves.227 Those promises may be 
broad or specific, clear or ambiguous, reliable or not. But without 
promises, there is little for the parties to negotiate. Yet promises made 
during a contract negotiation are intended for only one function—to 
discover what will be given in return if a contract is agreed upon. A buyer 
may promise to purchase all of a manufacturer’s stock, but if the 
manufacturer responds with a price the buyer objects to, the buyer’s 
promise may be moot as he may choose not to do business with that 
manufacturer. What rights does the manufacturer have to enforce that 
buyer’s promise? Was the buyer’s promise enforceable? That all depends 
on the legal environment in which they are negotiating. 
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A legal environment in which liability attaches for representations 
made or disclosures withheld during the negotiation phase adds a layer of 
risk to the party that may not be ready to commit to a formal contract yet.228 
On the contrary, such an environment provides additional protections to 
the party that takes steps in reliance on the representations made by the 
party unwilling to commit to the formal contract. This difference may be 
significant, creating risk for parties hoping to negotiate with multiple 
partners, and opportunity for parties in a weaker negotiating position. 
D.  Methodology 
The question that this article poses is the following: does legal 
tradition, due to differences in pre-contractual rules, affect a foreign 
investor’s appetite for new investments? In other words, does the risk of 
liability during contract negotiations help or hinder opportunities for 
entrepreneurial growth? 
A straightforward way to answer this question would be to compare 
outcomes in cases of pre-contractual liability across common and civil law 
jurisdictions by reviewing jurisprudence and judgments. However, in the 
case of both common and civil law countries, such cases rarely manifest 
in judicial opinions that can be used for comparative analysis.229 Most 
cases of this ilk are resolved through negotiation or commercial arbitration 
where no opinions are readily accessible.230 Thus, another approach is 
necessary to resolve this question. 
The second-best approach to answering this question seems to be 
through statistical analysis accompanied by a small sampling of anecdotes 
from cross-border transactional attorneys. With this approach, we can 
draw inferences from changes in the investment environment over time 
and contrast those changes across legal environments. For the statistical 
analysis, I assess whether there is a significant relationship between legal 
tradition and total entrepreneurial activity over time. For the qualitative 
inquiry, I inquired of numerous international practitioners in common and 
civil law jurisdictions to determine their awareness and level of counseling 
on pre-contractual liability risks.231 I received substantive responses from 
ten practitioners across civil and common law legal systems. Together, the 
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data and analysis will provide useful insights into the effects of legal 
tradition on investor risk. 
1. Quantitative Inquiry 
The quantitative analysis component of this study will use the number 
of start-up businesses formed between common law and civil law 
jurisdictions as a proxy measure of entrepreneurial activity across 
countries as the dependent variable, and legal tradition as the independent 
variable. Measured over a period of years, this proxy measure will reflect 
how entrepreneurial activity has changed over time and whether there is a 
significant difference of growth in countries that follow common or civil 
law legal traditions. A regression analysis will help show the existence and 
strength of any such relationship. 
To measure the number of start-up firms in different countries, I will 
use the Global Entrepreneurship Survey (GES), which is one of the most 
comprehensive and widely used tools for measuring entrepreneurial 
activity around the world.232 The survey is conducted by the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), a joint effort between Babson College 
and London Business School that provides data on entrepreneurship for 
researchers around the world.233 Their annual survey assesses developed 
and emerging markets around the world on a number of factors that 
influence entrepreneurial activity in those countries. 
Innovation has been identified in the National Framework Conditions 
as the third stage of economic development, following factor-driven and 
efficiency-driven economies. According to the GEM: 
The GEM conceptual framework derives from the basic 
assumption that national economic growth is the result of 
the personal capabilities of individuals to identify and 
seize opportunities, and that this process is affected by 
environmental factors which influence individuals’ 
decisions to pursue entrepreneurial initiatives.234 
The GEM measures entrepreneurial activity in three stages: 1) Total 
Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity, which identifies adults starting or 
operating a new business within the previous 42 months; 2) Rate of 
Established Businesses, which includes adults owning or operating a 
business for more than the past 42 months; and, 3) Business 
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.org/report (last visited Jan. 23, 2019). 
233 See What is GEM?, GLOBAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP MONITOR, https://www.
gemconsortium.org/about/news (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
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Discontinuation Rate, which includes adults who have discontinued a 
business in the past 12 months.235 The data includes responses from 
surveys distributed in 64 countries. The next section includes the results 
from both the quantitative and qualitative analyses. 
According to the National Expert Survey, also conducted by the GEM, 
the second most important factor taken into account by early-stage 
entrepreneurs following physical infrastructure is the commercial and 
legal infrastructure.236 North America has the most supportive 
entrepreneurship ecosystem, while Latin American and Africa struggle 
with the least favorable entrepreneurship conditions. 237 “Perhaps it is no 
coincidence that North America is made up of countries with common law 
jurisdictions whereas Latin America and Africa are composed of civil 
jurisdiction countries.”238 
To determine which legal environment is more hospitable to 
entrepreneurial activity, I extracted data from ten years of the GEM survey 
identifying total early-stage entrepreneurial activity in 64 countries and 
notated the type of legal system utilized in each of those countries. I further 
divided those countries by legal tradition, as displayed in Figure 1, below. 
Figure 1. Countries from 2016 GEM Survey by Legal Tradition. 
Because the focus of this article is on only common and civil law legal 
traditions, I have eliminated the religious and mixed systems from the 
remainder of the analysis. Of the remaining countries that were surveyed 
by the GEM report, I calculated the average early-stage entrepreneurial 
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activity among the civil law countries and among the common law 
countries. Such activity in common law countries was only slightly higher, 
on average, than in civil law countries, as noted in Figure 2, below. 
 Figure 2. Average Early-stage Entrepreneurial Activity. 
The difference in the two legal traditions with respect to early-stage 
entrepreneurial activity becomes much clearer when filtering countries by 
stage of development. Factor-driven economies are countries that pursue 
competitive advantage exclusively on the basis of factor endowments, 
such as natural resources. Investment-driven economies are those 
countries that focus on manufacturing of basic goods to drive economic 
growth. And innovation-driven economies are advanced economies that 
have solid infrastructure and legal institutions that facilitate investment in 
technologies that give these countries competitive advantages over factor-
driven and efficiency-driven economies.239 
For the purposes of this analysis, I have chosen to focus only on 
innovation-driven economies (see Table 1, below). These economies 
encourage foreign investment and, in most instances, maintain laws that 
allow such investments. I broke down the data above into groupings based 
upon their stage of development as notated by the GEM report—factor-
driven, efficiency-driven, and innovation-driven.240 Countries falling 
within the category of “innovation-driven” economies are those that are 
characterized as having strong institutions and incentives driving 
                                                                                                             
239 See, e.g., Stages of Development, HARV. BUS. SCH., http://www.isc.hbs.edu/
competitiveness-economic-development/frameworks-and-key-concepts/pages/shapes-of-
development.aspx (describing the distinctions between stages of economic development). 
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innovation.241 The risks associated with investment in factor- or 
investment-driven economies include political and economic instability, 
risks that are less prevalent in the innovation-driven economies. Countries 
that meet these criteria are listed below: 
Table 1. Innovation-driven Countries Segmented by Legal Tradition. 
 Again, taking the average early-stage entrepreneurial activity 
percentage from each of these countries and comparing them by legal 
tradition, the stark contrast between the two becomes evident. The figure 
below represents the division between civil law and common law 
innovation-driven economies (see Figure 3, below). 
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 Figure 3. Innovation Driven Economies Segmented by Legal Tradition. 
This data represents the situation in the current climate. But has there 
been a consistent advantage of common law systems over civil law 
systems in promoting entrepreneurial economic activity? To answer this, 
I extracted data from ten years of GEM surveys and measured the effect 
of legal tradition—common vs. civil law—on total entrepreneurial activity 
among innovation-driven economies over this period. The result was that 
in innovation-driven economies, legal tradition had a significant impact on 
the level of entrepreneurial activity (see Table 2 and Figure 5, below). 
The analysis is limited by the number of observations and the amount 
of available comparable data for the time period. I utilized GEM data from 
2001 through 2016 for all civil and common law countries in their dataset. 
The GEM surveys 54 countries covering 86% of global GDP.242 I then 
added the following independent variables: 1) stage of development 
(efficiency-driven, factor-driven or innovation-driven); 2) degree of 
contract enforcement;243 3) perceived opportunities to form a firm; 4) fear 
of failure rate; 5) percentage of individuals intending to start a new 
business in the next three years; and, 6) Total Early-Stage Entrepreneurial 
Activity. 
The regression below includes civil law (Group 0) and common law 
(Group 1) countries only. Data was gathered from GEM surveys between 
2006 and 2016 for which data was available. A combined 284 observations 
were used in this calculation. The null hypothesis used here is that there is 
no difference in level of entrepreneurial activity between civil and 
common law legal systems. The resulting P-value is significant at the .001 
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level, meaning that we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there 
is likely a significant difference in levels of entrepreneurial activity 
between civil and common law countries based upon legal tradition. 
Table 2. T-Test with equal variance comparing means of civil and 
common law systems against total entrepreneurial activity. 
  
 Figure 4. Graphical representation of T-Test comparing means of civil and 
common systems against total entrepreneurial activity. 
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 Figure 5. Regression analysis of the effects of legal tradition on total 
entrepreneurial activity. 
The regression (see Figure 5, above) was conducted to assess the 
correlation between legal tradition and total entrepreneurial activity 
(TEA). Three control factors were used—the rule of law factor, which 
measures investor risk based upon the legal and political climate; the 
Entrepreneurial Intentions factor,244 which measures perceived investment 
opportunities in the target market; and the contract factor, which measures 
the perceived security of contracts.245 The regression shows that 
approximately 65% of the impact on TEA stems from the factors 
accounted for in this analysis. It also shows that legal system, represented 
by “system_n,” is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level, 
indicating a strong impact on TEA. 
The T-Test and regression displayed above show a correlation 
between legal system and entrepreneurial activity in innovation-driven 
economies; however, it must be noted that correlation does not equate to 
causation. A number of other factors could be affecting the investment 
environment, including political risk, market size, and the governing 
environment in which the investment would be made. Nevertheless, other 
studies using distinct methodologies have found that there is good reason 
to conclude that legal tradition affects the economic environment. 
The most well-known economic analysis of legal traditions and their 
impact on the economic environment was conducted by World Bank 
researchers in 2008.246 In that study, the researchers concluded that 
                                                                                                             
244 This factor is captured by the GEM survey. See GEM GLOBAL REPORT, supra note 
240. 
245 See WORLD BANK, supra note 243. 
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common law countries tended to fare better in the areas of institutions, 
judicial independence, and investor protections.247 These are some of the 
same criteria that create an environment conducive to entrepreneurial 
activity. But in order to link these findings to pre-contractual liability, we 
must assess whether it is in fact the risk of pre-contractual liability that is 
deterring investors from operating as frequently in civil law countries as 
they are in common law countries. For this, a qualitative analysis is 
necessary. 
2. Qualitative Inquiry 
While the quantitative data shows that there is a significant 
relationship between legal tradition and entrepreneurial activity over time, 
this does not necessarily mean that it is pre-contractual liability per se that 
drives the difference. We do know that legal tradition influences 
investment,248 and many factors—including the use of precedent, 
adversarial proceedings, or even the influence of juries—may have an 
impact on the decision of which legal system should govern a 
transaction.249 Nevertheless, one of the factors that may drive the initial 
decision by an investor about which country to invest in is their confidence 
in the negotiation process. Whether they will be required to disclose 
adverse information, attest to representations that may hurt their 
bargaining position, or negotiate in good faith at all, may affect the 
strength of the position of the investor. 
To add context to the quantitative analysis above, I asked several 
cross-border legal practitioners in both civil and common law countries 
about their sense of investment risk related to distinctions in pre-
contractual liability. My conversations included the General Counsel of a 
Dutch multinational company,250 an Italian attorney from Price 
Waterhouse Coopers,251 and attorneys at law firms in Ecuador,252 
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Argentina,253 Uruguay,254 Indonesia,255 Poland,256 and the United States.257 
An overview of those informative conversations is included below. 
According to the general counsel of a major Dutch multinational 
company, the risks of pre-contractual liability differ depending on which 
side of the transaction the investor sits.258 A buyer of goods, services, or 
intellectual property would be better protected in an environment that 
requires full disclosures and good faith negotiation, which they would find 
in a civil law environment. Likewise, an investor selling goods, services, 
or intellectual property would be better positioned in an environment that 
allows the parties to choose what to disclose or represent and that does not 
statutorily establish requirements for the negotiation process, which would 
be the case in a common law jurisdiction. This is part of the reason why 
common law contracts, which must spell-out such pre-contractual 
measures, tend to be significantly longer and more thorough than civil law 
contracts, which can look to statutes to provide such measures.259 
A U.S. legal practitioner suggested that the major risk apparent in pre-
contractual liability between legal systems exists in the good faith 
negotiating requirements that are present in civil but not common law 
jurisdictions.260 The German legal concept of culpa in contrahendo, which 
obligates negotiating parties to act in good faith, establishes clear statutory 
requirements on negotiating parties before a contract is formed. A 
thorough analysis of this concept and the risks that it poses was published 
in 1964: 
Once parties enter into negotiations for a contract, the 
sweeping language of the cases informs us, a relationship 
of trust and confidence comes into existence, irrespective 
of whether they succeed or fail. Thus, protection is 
accorded against blameworthy conduct which prevents 
the consummation of a contract. A party is liable for 
negligently creating the expectation that a contract would 
                                                                                                             
253 Interview with Rafael Pereyra Zorraquin, Attorney, Navarro Castex Abogados, Arg. 
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be forth- coming although he knows or should know that 
the expectation cannot be realized.261 
However, as that practitioner noted, there are provisions in U.S. law 
that account for the absence of statutory requirements to negotiate in good 
faith. Among others, mistake,262 misrepresentation,263 negligence264 and 
estoppel265 might be argued as grounds to seek damages if a contract 
resulted. The major difference in the legal traditions here is that common 
law will not generally provide remedies for failed negotiations due to bad 
faith where no contract resulted, whereas civil law may impose liability 
even in the absence of a contract. 
Across all of the practitioners that I spoke with, the risks were 
recognized, but clients were rarely counseled to choose a particular market 
on the basis of legal tradition as it relates to pre-contractual liability. This 
would seem to make sense as it is the legal practitioner that would be best 
positioned to craft language in letters of intent and other pre-contractual 
documents that would protect their client in any legal system. Thus, what 
the data appears to tell us is that the risks of negotiating in a common law 
environment, where little protection exists for pre-contractual promises, 
can be mitigated by effective legal counsel. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This article began with a single question—do differences in pre-
contractual liability between civil and common law jurisdictions affect the 
entrepreneurial environment in those jurisdictions? I conducted a 
quantitative analysis that showed a significant relationship between legal 
tradition and entrepreneurial activity. I then used interviews with cross-
jurisdictional attorneys and extensive historical and current legal 
assessments to add context to the quantitative findings. The research 
shows legal traditions do affect the risk for entrepreneurs across legal 
environments; however, that risk can be mitigated with effective legal 
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guidance and understanding of the differing degrees to which an investor’s 
pre-contractual statements will affect his or her liability. Entrepreneurs 
operating without legal counsel equipped in cross-jurisdictional practice 
face the most significant risks. 
This article, then, serves as a starting point for a broader discussion of 
inconsistencies across legal traditions with respect to commercial 
transactions. Globalization and interdependence have made cross-border 
contracts an almost foregone conclusion. Yet as business speeds ahead to 
find the best commercial relationships around the world, the law has yet 
to catch-up by providing predictable and consistent rules for commercial 
transactions across jurisdictions. And while earnest attempts to smooth 
over these choppy waters have been made in the past,266 parties with 
experienced legal counsel have preferred to resort to choice-of-law clauses 
that import their home rules and arbitration clauses that cut-out local courts 
in order to create the predictability that is missing in the judicial system. 
Unwitting and bold entrepreneurs who choose to wade into the murky 
waters of cross-border contracts without experienced counsel may find 
themselves in dangerous territory.267 It is here that we must focus our 
inquiry to ensure that micro and small enterprises can take full advantage 
of the global business environment while minimizing the risks that are 
inherent in cross-border contract negotiation. 
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